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IT IS USEFUL to warn,  as Jeremy  Bulow  and  Kenneth  Rogoff  do in another 
paper  in this issue, that "debt reduction"  is not necessarily a panacea 
for heavily indebted countries. Many of the new schemes for debt 
reduction,  such as exit bonds, buybacks,  and  debt-equity  swaps, can be 
a poor  deal  for a debtor  country,  even when it is thereby  enabled  to retire 
debt at a discount relative to face value. It may make little sense for a 
debtor country to nibble away at its debt in a series of piecemeal 
transactions  in which a bit of debt is repurchased  at a discount in each 
transaction. Debt-equity swap programs, and other "voluntary debt 
reduction"  schemes in the U.S. Treasury's  so-called menu of options, 
almost always have this piecemeal character. It is no accident that 
Citicorp,  rather  than  the  debtor  countries,  is the  world's  leading  advocate 
of debt-equity  swaps. 
An awareness  of the dangers  of piecemeal  debt  relief,  however, should 
not be generalized  into the proposition  that retiring  deeply discounted 
debt is invariably  bad for the debtor  country. Buybacks  can be a useful 
and even important  device for an overly indebted  country, when they 
are  part  of a comprehensive  arrangement  for the debtor  country,  as they 
were in the recent case in Bolivia. 
-  In this paper, I will first  explain why comprehensive  debt reduction 
mechanisms, including  buybacks, can be highly desirable. I will then 
suggest  why these mechanisms  have not so far played a significant  role 
in the debt strategy of the United States and the multilateral  lending 
This paper  grew out of what  was originally  to be a discussion  of the paper  by Jeremy 
Bulow  and  Kenneth  Rogoff  in this volume. 
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institutions.  Finally, I will show why the Bolivian case is a successful 
example of a comprehensive  strategy of debt reduction, one that has 
been to the benefit  of Bolivia  and  its creditors  as well. 
The General Case for Debt Reduction Operations 
The analytical  framework  used in the Bulow-Rogoff  paper  is a useful 
starting  point. In that framework,  there is no particular  reason for a 
debtor  country  to pursue  debt  reduction,  even if it is of a comprehensive 
nature-a  buyback of all of the debt. Consider a country that is so 
hopelessly over-indebted  that its debt has a secondary  market  value of 
5 percent of face value, say $50 million on $1 billion of principal.  In 
the Bulow-Rogoff  framework,  the $50 million represents the present 
value of expected payments  on the debt and therefore  the full burden  of 
the 'debt, in the sense that the country should never pay more than 
$50 million  even to buy the entire $1 billion of debt from the creditors 
and  thereby  resolve the debt crisis. 
But, in reality, there is a burden  of the debt that goes beyond the 
expected  repayments,  reflecting  the various  costs to the country  of being 
in default.I  A country  that owes $1 billion on which it can pay only an 
expected $50  million  will face great  difficulty  in new borrowing,  even for 
highly productive investments.2  It will face high bargaining  costs in 
handling  the $1  billion  of bad  debt.3  It will  face sanctions  from  disgruntled 
1. I first  presented  this theory  for debt  reduction  in the developing-country  context  in 
Jeffrey  Sachs, "The Debt Overhang  of Developing  Countries,"  in Ronald  Findlay,  ed., 
Debt, Stabilization andDevelopment:Essays  in Memory ofCarlosDiazAlejandro  (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1988).  Further  articles  in this spirit  include  Sachs and Harry  Huizinga, 
"U.S.  -Commercial  Banks and the Developing-Country  Debt Crisis," BPEA, 2:1987, 
pp. 555-601;  Elhanan  Helpman,  "Voluntary  Debt Reduction:  Incentives  and Welfare," 
Working  Paper 2692 (National Bureau  of Economic Research, August 1988);  Paul R. 
Krugman,  "Market-Based  Debt-Reduction  Schemes," Working  Paper 2587 (NBER, 
May 1988);  Kenneth  A. Froot, "Buybacks,  Exit Bonds, and the Optimality  of Debt and 
Liquidity  Relief" (MIT, 1988).  All of these papers  demonstrate  the potential  efficiency 
gains  from  debt  reduction  operations. 
2. No bank will lend to the Argentine  government,  for example, even for a highly 
profitable  public  investment,  for fear  that  the loan  will simply  become  part  of Argentina's 
overall  bad  debt. It is dangerous  to lend  even if the individual  project  has a good return. 
3. Negotiations  may  break  down  repeatedly,  at  high  cost (for  example,  with  disruptions 
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creditors,  such  as a withdrawal  of trade  credits, that  will hinder  its future 
economic performance.4  It will face a major internal  disincentive to 
economic  reforms  that  increase  the debt service  capacity  of the country, 
since the costs of reform  are borne by the country while many of the 
benefits  of reform  will be appropriated  by creditors  who receive higher 
repayments  in the event of reform.5 
For these reasons, it may well be beneficial  for the country to pay 
much more than the $50 million  (in present-value  terms)  to cancel the 
overhang  of $1 billion  of mostly bad  debts. These payments  could come 
in the  form  of a direct  cash buyback,  especially  if the country  can borrow 
the funds for the buyback from friendly governments, or some other 
arrangement  where future  debt payments  of over $50 million  are guar- 
anteed  by the debtor  country.  A cash-starved  country  would obviously 
prefer  to find  ways to make  the present  value of payments  in the future, 
rather  than with current  cash.6  In either case, however, by eliminating 
the overhang,  the country  would avoid the costs of default  and regain 
the incentives  for internal  reform. 
The Bulow and Rogoff  framework  is generally  correct, however, for 
demonstrating  that paying  more than the $50 million  makes sense only 
if most or all of the debt  overhang  is thereby  solved (although  Rotemberg 
posture and to act tough. For theoretical  analyses, see Raquel Fernandez  and David 
Kaaret,  "Bank  Size, Reputation,  and  Debt  Renegotiation,"  Working  Paper  2704  (NBER, 
September  1988);  and  Julio  Rotemberg,  "  Sovereign  Debt  Buybacks  Can  Lower  Bargaining 
Costs" (MIT,  October  1988). 
4.  Even  if the banks  know  that  the  debt  cannot  be paid,  they  may  still  impose  sanctions 
for nonpayment  to impress  other  debtors  with  whom  they are  negotiating. 
5. Consider  a case of an economic  reform  that  would  cost $100  million  of current  con- 
sumption  and  raise  the debtor's  future  income  and  debt  servicing  capacity  by $200  million 
in present  value. Suppose that all of this incremental  debt servicing  capacity  would be 
squeezed  out of the country  by the foreign  creditors  in the course  of future  negotiations. 
The  debtor  has no incentive  to undertake  the reform,  despite  its high  return,  because  the 
benefits  accrue to the foreign creditors. However, if the country first entered into a 
buyback,  in which  it paid  $60  million  for the $1 billion  in debt, thereby  canceling  the debt 
overhang,  it would  then  be free to undertake  the investment  and  to reap  the large  returns. 
Notice that  this incentive  effect could  work  through  the incentives  on a given  govern- 
ment  (by leading  the government  officials  to a rejection  of specific  public  investments  or 
public  sector  reforms),  or through  the electoral  process, by contributing  to the election  of 
governments  that  oppose the reform  efforts. 
6. As an example, the country  could negotiate  with creditors  to use the receipts of 
future  export  earnings  as collateral  for future  debt service payments,  in cases where it 
would  be administratively  possible  to arrange  for future  export  earnings  to accumulate  in 
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has proved that even marginal  buyback operations can be beneficial 
under  some circumstances,  if the deadweight  burden  of the debt is high 
enough).7  It will usually make  little sense, for example, for the country 
to pay $6 million  of cash in a one-shot transaction  to reduce its debt by 
$100 million  of face value if there remains  $900 million of mostly bad 
debt  on the books.8 
This negative  assessment of most small  buybacks  is reinforced  when 
we step back from a static model and view a small buyback  in a more 
realistic multiperiod  context. In a buyback, the country uses current 
cash to repurchase  principal  that has been rescheduled  for many  years. 
The current  contractual  burden  on the debt that is repurchased  is only 
the interest due. If the repurchase  price of the debt is greater  than the 
interest rate-for  example, if the debt sells for 50 cents on the dollar, 
when  interest  rates  are 10  cents  perdollarof  debt-then acash repurchase 
reflects  an acceleration  of payments  on the debt, even though  the debt 
is bought at a discount. For this reason, debt-equity swaps tend to 
impose an enormous  cash flow burden  on the debtor  country. Govern- 
ments involved in anti-inflation  programs  are, for this reason as well, 
strongly  advised  to avoid  debt-equity  swap  programs,  which  are usually 
pressed  upon them  by the banks. 
Why Comprehensive  Deals Are Hard to Make 
Even mutually  advantageous  debt reduction  schemes, in which the 
debtor  clears the debt overhang  and  the creditors  raise  the total value of 
payments that they receive, are unlikely to occur under the current 
official debt management  strategy. The reasons are not far to seek. 
First, heavily exposed banks have an inherent  incentive to reject buy- 
back deals, even when they are efficient from the point of view of 
banks  as a whole-that  is, when they raise the market  value of overall 
debt repayments.9  Second, the U.S. government, the main arbiter  of 
7.  See Rotemberg,  "Sovereign  Debt Buybacks." 
8. Note that the country  might  have to pay 6 percent  on the transaction,  even if the 
current  secondary  market  price  of the debt  is 5 percent,  since the repurchase  would  tend 
to drive  up the price  on the remaining  debt. 
9. The perverse  incentives that I am discussing  affect only four or five U.S. banks. 
They  are,  however,  among  the  biggest.  They  include  Citicorp,  Bank  of America,  Chemical 
Bank, Chase  Manhattan,  and Manufacturers  Hanover.  Outside  the United States, there 
are  probably  no banks  at all in the situation  under  discussion. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  709 
the kind of deals that take place, has vetoed almost all comprehensive 
debt reduction  schemes on behalf of the most heavily exposed banks. 
Third,  negotiations  over the debt of smaller  countries  are guided  by the 
creditors'  concerns  over precedent  for the large  debtors,  rather  than  for 
the efficiency  of the outcome  for the small  debtor.  It is generally  thought 
best to strangle  a little  country,  even at the expense of the country's  debt 
servicing, if it sends a convincing signal to Brazil and Mexico to keep 
paying  the debt. 
Why would a heavily exposed bank reject a comprehensive  deal? 
Suppose that a bank holds $100 million of debt at face value, with 
$90 million  in liabilities  to depositors, and $10 million  of book value of 
shareholders'  equity. If the debt is worth only 5 percent of face value, 
then the bank  cannot meet its liabilities  in present  value, and should  be 
liquidated  by the regulators. 
In practice,  however, the regulators  would  allow the bank  to keep the 
debt on the books at face value ($100  million)  rather  than market  value 
($5 million), and the depositors would be fully insured  by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance  Corporation.  The bank  managers,  acting  on behalf  of 
the shareholders,  would try to continue to run  the bank, on the chance 
that  some highly  profitable  investments  will come along  and  put  the bank 
into the black.  10  The bank would have a positive market  value despite 
having  assets worth less than liabilities, reflecting  the option value on 
future  investment  opportunities,  combined  with the FDIC  guarantees. 
How would the bank  regard  a cash buyback  in which the debtor  pays 
$100 million for the $1 billion of debt? Obviously it should reject the 
deal, even though the market  value of the debt would go up, since it 
would be forced to write down the face value of the debt.1'  The bank 
would  immediately  be liquidated  after  the buyback,  since the regulators 
would  have to act on a bank  with negative  book  value. The FDIC should 
be delighted  with the buyback since it would reduce the FDIC's likely 
long-term  cost of paying  off the depositors, but the bank  managers  and 
shareholders  would  reject  the buyback  proposal. 
Even if the buyback  did not force a liquidation,  it could well force a 
change of bank management,  by reducing the book value of capital 
10. As with the savings and loans in the mid-1980s,  the banks  would also have the 
incentive  to go after  highly  profitable,  highly  risky  ventures  (as perhaps  with  money-center 
financing  of leveraged  buyouts  in the mid-1980s). 
11. The buyback  constitutes  an "accounting  event" that  forces the bank  to mark  to 
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enough  to force the intervention  of the bank  regulators.  Thus, even for 
heavily exposed banks not at risk of insolvency, bank  managers  might 
oppose buybacks  for fear of losing theirjobs  . 
Few, if any, banks in the United States would now be placed at 
fundamental  risk by a widespread  write-down  on claims on the LDCs, 
but U.S. policymakers  have not wanted to test that proposition.  They 
have acted with one goal in mind:  prevent  a process that  could escalate 
into widespread  write-downs,  which in turn  might  threaten  the survival 
of current  management  of even one or two of the most heavily exposed 
banks. And it is  the U.S.  government, even  more than the banks 
themselves, that determines the parameters  of the debt negotiating 
process. So far, the U.S. government,  working  in tandem  with the most 
heavily  exposed money-center  banks, has rejected  virtually  all attempts 
at a comprehensive  settlement  of the debt."2  The U.S. government  has 
made interest servicing of bank debt a litmus test of foreign policy 
relations between most debtor countries and the United States. Most 
debtor  governments  pay their  debts not out of fear of the banks, but out 
of fear of a foreign  policy rupture  with the United States.'3 
The Bolivian Buyback 
In only one case to date has the U.S. government  supported  a policy 
of debt relief. After long and difficult  negotiations  with the government 
of Bolivia, it endorsed  a strategy  that has been highly  beneficial  for all 
parties, in accordance with the theory of the debt overhang outlined 
12. As an example, when the Brazilian  government  announced  its intention  in the 
summer  of 1987  to negotiate  a comprehensive  package  of debt  reduction  (by a conversion 
of debt to bonds with below-market  interest  rates), it was Secretary  of Treasury  James 
Baker  III, and  not the banks,  who first  determined  that  the proposal  was a "nonstarter." 
In that  case, as in  almost  all  others,  the U.S. government  set the  parameters  of negotiation, 
by determining  what is and what is not in the so-called  menu  of options  available  to the 
developing  countries  and  the banks. 
13. This  fear  comes from  several  sources. Bad  relations  with  the United  States  would 
make  it hard  for the debtor  to secure  an International  Monetary  Fund  program  and  World 
Bank  financing,  which  in turn  would  frustrate  relations  with other  bilateral  creditors  (for 
example, by preventing  a Paris Club  rescheduling  of government-to-government  debt). 
Moreover,  powerful  conservative  elites within  the debtor  countries,  especially  in Argen- 
tina, Brazil,  and  Mexico, view good relations  with  the United  States  as crucial  in avoiding 
a dangerous  internal political  turn  to populism  or  to the  far  left. Thus  these  elites  vigorously 
oppose a hard-line  position  on the debt. Third,  the debtor  country  might  have important Jeffrey D. Sachs  711 
earlier.'4  Bolivia, alone of the high-inflation  countries in the Southern 
Cone, has been able to stabilize and to resume growth, because it has 
not been trapped  by excessive debt repayments.  Political stability  has 
also been restored,  after  the chaos and  virtual  anarchy  of hyperinflation 
during 1984-85. 
During 1982-84, Bolivia was treated like any other small debtor 
country.  It was in deep financial  crisis, paying  nearly  6 percent  of GNP 
each  year  during  1982-84  in net resource  transfer  to the  foreign  creditors. 
In April of 1984 hyperinflation  set in; by August 1985, inflation  had 
reached 24,000 percent-the  world's worst in 40 years. Real GNP 
declined about 30 percent in per capita terms during  1980-85. In mid- 
1984,  during  the hyperinflation,  Bolivia ceased most foreign  debt pay- 
ments  after  the Bolivian  Treasury  ran  out of foreign  reserves. 
A new government  came to power in mid-1985  and undertook re- 
markable  stabilization  efforts to halt the hyperinflation.15 Despite the 
economic catastrophe  facing the country, official  U.S. and IMF policy 
in the spring  of 1986  was that Bolivia should  resume interest  payments 
on its foreign  bank  debt. Indeed, in March  1986,  only two months  after 
price stability  had been restored  to the country, the IMF was urging  a 
large devaluation  in Bolivia to facilitate increased interest payments 
to the commercial  banks.16 The Bolivian government  was convinced 
that such a move, in addition  to destroying  the economic and political 
basis of the stabilization  program  itself, would cause a collapse of the 
government. 
In the spring of  1986, the Bolivian government urged a different 
approach in discussions with the U.S.  government and the IMF.'7 
Ultimately, the official creditor community and the IMF agreed to 
strategic  concerns  (for example,  Argentina,  following  the Falklands  War)  that cause the 
government  to toe the U.S. line. Fourth,  the  government  might  fear  retaliation  in the form 
of hostile  trade  policies  from  the United  States  in the event that  it opposes  the U.S. foreign 
policy  line. 
14. I have  been  closely involved  in the Bolivian  debt  negotiations,  as the  government's 
main  outside  economic  advisor. 
15. Overall  tax revenues  were  raised  by almost  10  percent  of GNP  during  the first  year 
and  a half.  The politically  and socially  important  mining  sector  was virtually  closed down 
after  the collapse  of world  tin  prices  in October  1985. 
16. The IMF was pressing  for net interest  payments  to the banks in 1986  of about 
$40  million. 
17. Bolivia  during  this  crucial  period  did  not make  progress  in negotiations  with  banks. 
The official  negotiations  with the IMF, and discussions  with the U.S. government,  were 
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treat the Bolivian case on the merits of the Bolivian situation, and 
acknowledge  that Bolivia's foreign  bank  debt could not be paid, at least 
under  conditions  consistent with economic and political  stability  in the 
country.'8  The IMF agreed to grant Bolivia a program  based on its 
successful stabilization  efforts and despite the fact that the Bolivian 
government  had not reached any understanding  with the commercial 
bank creditors. The IMF agreement  was the first in which the debtor 
country  was not obliged  to pay interest  to the banks  and  to clear interest 
arrears. 
In late 1986, once the banks saw that the U.S. government  and the 
IMF were not going to defend  their  position  vis-a-vis Bolivia, the banks 
began  to discuss with  Bolivia  a longer-term  solution  to its debt  overhang. 
Because U.S. regulators  had begun to force write-downs  of Bolivian 
debt  in  the  banks'  books, the  banks  no longer  had  any  important  incentive 
to  hold on to  Bolivia's debt in their books.'9 After two  years of 
complicated discussions and legal work, the buyback was arranged. 
During  the entire  period  of discussions, Bolivia did not pay any interest 
to the commercial  banks. At the same time, Bolivia received large net 
resource transfers, on the order of about 5 percent of GNP per year, 
from  the official  creditors. 
With  the buyback, Bolivia repurchased  about one-half  of its debt at 
11 cents per dollar  of face value. The money used for this purpose  was 
donated from foreign governments. While some of the money might 
otherwise  have come to Bolivia as foreign  aid in other  forms, much  of it 
would not. I would guess that of the $34 million  spent on the buyback, 
Bolivia  might  have been able to get $15-20 million  of the money in other 
forms  of aid. 
Although its remaining debt is  still deeply discounted, Bolivia's 
18. Among  the complex  reasons  for this change  of position, the most important  was 
the ferocity of the economic crisis in Bolivia, combined  with the strength  of Bolivia's 
adjustment  program,  which eliminated  tens of thousands  of jobs in state enterprises  and 
closed the budget  deficit by more than 10 percent of GNP almost overnight.  Also the 
United  States had important  foreign  policy interests  in stabilizing  democracy  in Bolivia, 
which  borders  most of the large  countries  of South  America  and  has often been feared  as 
a center of unrest (Che Guevara's  death in the Bolivian  jungles in 1967  being a case in 
point).  Moreover,  the United States was interested  in pursuing  an anti-cocaine  policy in 
the region,  and  could  accomplish  it only with  a friendly,  stable  government. 
19. Bolivia  was one of the few countries  subject  to an ATRR  (allocated  transfer  risk 
reserve), in which the U.S. regulators  force a write-down  in book value of the debt. 
Intentionally,  the regulators  have avoided  any forced write-downs  for the largest  debtor 
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position  is much  improved  from  what it was before  the buyback.  Under 
current U.S.  and IMF policy, Bolivia is not being pressed on the 
remaining  part of the debt, except to settle that remainder  on a basis 
similar  to the buyback.20  In effect, the official  community  is supporting 
a gradual  process in which Bolivia will clear all of its commercial  bank 
debts at a price of about 11 percent of face value. Meanwhile, as this 
process goes forward,  the official  community  will not impose sanctions 
on Bolivia  for nonpayments  on the remaining  bank  debt. 
Was the debt strategy  of the IMF and U.S. government  successful in 
the case of Bolivia?  The answer  is a resounding  yes, for all of the parties 
concerned. In effect, the official community recognized in 1986 the 
futility  of trying  to press Bolivia to pay unpayable  debt. As a result, the 
Bolivian government  got the time and international  support  to put in 
place a remarkably  strong  and effective stabilization  program  that has 
ended a hyperinflation  and  restored  economic growth  to the country  for 
the first time in almost a decade. Bolivia's political stability has been 
enhanced,  as have its democratic  institutions.  The creditors  as a whole 
benefited  as well, as shown by the fact that Bolivia's debt rose in value 
from 5 cents per dollar  to 11  cents per dollar. This increase in the price 
of debt  was not  a giveaway  by Bolivia.2'  It  reflects,  instead,  the creditors' 
share  of the remarkable  turnaround  of the Bolivian  economy, from the 
worst in the world  during  the early 1980s  to one of stability  and  incipient 
recovery  in 1988. 
Bolivia's success story depended  strongly  on the supportive  actions 
of the U. S. government  and  the IMF, in providing  a framework  in which 
Bolivia could successfully negotiate with its bank creditors. Effective 
progress  for other debtor  countries  will require  similar  official  forbear- 
ance. As the Bolivian  case has demonstrated,  the debtor  as well as the 
creditors, at least taken as a group, can benefit importantly  from a 
realistic  approach  to comprehensive  debt reduction. 
20. Bolivia  has  just signed  a three-year  Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  with 
the  IMF,  based  on a program  of balance  of payments  that  presumes  that  Bolivia's  remaining 
debt  will  be settled  on terms  similar  to the buyback. 
21  . The financial  costs to Bolivia  of the debt strategy  have been minimal.  If we judge 
the net cash costs of the buyback  to Bolivia at $20 million,  the country  has paid  in total 
over three years less than 1 percent of one year's GNP ($20 million/$3  billion) to its 
commercial  bank creditors. At the same time Bolivia has received large net resource 
inflows  from  the official  creditor  community-in contrast  to all of the other countries  in 
the  region,  who have been making  large  net resource  transfers  to the foreign  creditors,  as 
Bolivia  itself  did  during  1982-84. Comments 
and Discussion 
Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff: We are pleased that Jeffrey Sachs" 
interesting  paper,  originally  written  as a discussion  of our  report,  agrees 
with our central  point: that voluntary  participation  buybacks  and debt 
equity swaps can be a bad  deal even when they allow a country  to retire 
debt at substantial  discount from face value. In turn, we agree witi 
Sachs that  if a country  can negotiate  for a large  repurchase  of its debt ir 
which all creditors  are forced  to participate,  the country  may benefit. 
Our main disagreement  concerns whether the overhang of foreigi 
debt significantly  hinders growth in the debtor countries, and if so 
whether  debtors  should  employ  voluntary  participation  buyback  scheme, 
to alleviate  the problem.  It is hard  to believe that  foreign  debt  is the mail 
impediment to growth in Latin America, as advocates of the deb 
overhang  view seem to imply. A country such as Bolivia would hav( 
had  to forgo  only a week's GNP  to meet  thefull annual  interest  payment, 
on its predefault  private  bank  debt. For most highly  indebted  countries 
the recent debt crisis is best viewed as a symptom  of poor growth an( 
not a cause of it. In 1961,  Japan's  per capita  GNP was 15  percent  lowe] 
than Argentina's.  In 1986,  Argentina's  per capita GNP was 15 percen 
of Japan's. 
However, even if debt  overhang  is important  empirically,  its presence 
would only strengthen  our basic conclusion  that debtors  should  engage 
in buybacks  (of any size) only if they are compensated  by their  creditor! 
for doing  so.  ' 
1. We  in  fact  discuss  efficiency  issues  in  our  report,  but  deal  with  them  more  thoroughly 
in the companion  paper  we cite, Bulow and Rogoff, "Sovereign  Debt Repurchases:  No 
Cure  for Overhang"  (Stanford  University,  October  1988). 
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Sachs argues  that efficiency-enhancing  buybacks  have been blocked 
by a U.S. government  whose Latin American  foreign policy has been 
deeply concerned  with protecting  current  bank  management.  Our  view 
is that  the banks  and  countries  have not negotiated  comprehensive  debt 
restructurings  primarily  because the feasible efficiency gains are not 
very large. 
Finally,  it is important  to emphasize  that  our analysis  is not sensitive 
to whether  the funds  for a buyback  come from  the debtor  country's  own 
cash reserves or from third-party  donors. Our message is that a well- 
intentioned  donor government can help the debtor country more by 
giving  it aid directly  than  by earmarking  the same  funds  for a buyback. 